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PUNITIVE DAMAGES-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held
that punitive damages do not have to bear a reasonable relation-
ship to compensatory damages.
Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 521 Pa. 97, 555 A.2d 800
(1989).
In 1978, Lisbon Contractors, Inc., (hereinafter "Lisbon"), was in
the process of installing a sewer line and bike path for the Uw-
chlan Township Municipal Authority of Chester County.1 During
the course of the installation, a bulldozer being used by Lisbon
made a clearing of approximately 1,200 feet, which was used for
storage, on wooded property owned by Edward and Carole Kirk-
bride, (hereinafter "the Kirkbrides").2 In'June of 1987, the Kirk-
brides brought a trespass action against Lisbon in the Court of
Common Pleas of Chester County to recover for the damages sus-
tained to their property.' At the conclusion of the trial, the judge
instructed the jury that the amount assessed as punitive damages
did not have to bear any relationship to the amount awarded as
compensatory damages and that the awarding of compensatory
damages was not a necessity for the awarding of punitive dam-
ages." After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of $7,000 in
compensatory damages and $70,000 in punitive damages. Upon
1. Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 357 Pa. Super. 322, 516 A.2d 1, 2 (1986).
2. 516 A.2d at 2.
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id. The trial court followed the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury instructions
(Civil) § 14.02, Subcommittee Draft (September 26, 1976), which were also given by the trial
court in Rhoads v. Heberling, 306 Pa. Super. 35, 451 A.2d 1378 (1982). Id. at 2. The instruc-
tions read as follows:
If you decide that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages, the
amount of such damages must be fixed by you. In doing so you may consider any or
all of the following factors: (1) the character of the defendant's act, (2) the nature and
extent of the harm to the plaintiff which the defendant caused or intended to cause
[in this regard you may include the plaintiff's trouble and expense in seeking to pro-
tect his interests in legal proceedings and in this suit] (3) the wealth of the defendant
insofar as it is relevant in fixing an amount which will punish him (it), and deter him
(it) and others from like conduct in the future. [The amount you assess as punitive
damages need not bear any relationship to the amount you choose to award as com-
pensatory damages, and] it is not necessary that you award compensatory damages to
the plaintiff in order to assess punitive damages against the defendant so long as you
find in favor of the plaintiff on the question of liability.
Rhoads, 451 A.2d at 1380 n.1.
5. Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 521 Pa. 97, 555 A.2d 800 (1989). The Kirk-
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post-trial motions being denied, Lisbon appealed to the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania.6
The Superior Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred
in not instructing the jury that punitive damages must be reasona-
ble and not disproportionate to compensatory damages. 7 The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania granted a petition for allowance of
appeal.8
The issue before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
whether punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to
compensatory damages.9 In the majority opinion, 10 written by Jus-
tice Zappala, the Court held that because punitive damages need
not bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages, the
trial court properly instructed the jury."
Justice Zappala began his analysis by stating that because the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania misconstrued Comment (e) of Sec-
tion 908 of the Restatement of Torts when it ruled in Hughes v.
Babcock, 2 that punitive damages must be proportional to compen-
satory damages, the Hughes decision was not controlling. 3 Justice
Zappala further stated that cases subsequent to Hughes must be
evaluated to determine the viability of the reasonable relationship
theory of punitive damages. 4
To begin this evaluation, the Court explained its decision in Hil-
brides recovered a second verdict of $12,000 for damage also done by Lisbon to an embank-
ment. This second verdict was not at issue. Id. at 801 n.1.
6. Id. at 801.
7. Id. See Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 357 Pa. Super. 322, 516 A.2d 1
(1986). For the holding in this case, the Superior Court relied upon an earlier line of cases
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the most recent of which was Hughes v. Babcock,
349 Pa. 475, 37 A.2d 551 (1944). The Superior Court reasoned that since this line of cases
was not overruled and since it was most recently followed in Martin v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 508 Pa. 154, 494 A.2d 1088 (1985), the reasonable relationship requirement was still
viable. Kirkbride, 555 A.2d at 801.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Justice Zappala's majority opinion was joined by Justices Nix, Larsen, McDer-
mott, Papadakos and Stout. Id. Justice Flaherty filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 804.
11. Id. at 803.
12. 349 Pa. 475, 37 A.2d 551 (1944).
13. Kirkbride, 555 A.2d at 802. Comment (e) to Section 908 of the Restatement of
Torts states that
... Itihe wealth of the defendant is also relevant, since the purposes of exemplary
damages are to punish for a past event and to prevent future offenses, and the degree
of punishment or deterrence resulting from a judgement is to some extent in propor-
tion to the means of the guilty person.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908, comment (e) (1939).
14. 555 A.2d at 802.
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bert v. Roth, 5 which held that an award of punitive damages was
not appropriate if actual damages had not been suffered."6 In ex-
plaining this case, Justice Zappala noted that the plaintiff at-
tempted to pursue an independent cause of action for punitive
damages because the cause of action for compensatory damages
had been dismissed. 17 In light of the nature of the Hilbert case,
Justice Zappala emphasized the essence of the holding to be that
punitive damages are an element of damages arising out of the ini-
tial cause of action, and if that cause of action is dismissed, the
punitive damages which are incident to the actual damages cannot
stand."' To further reinforce and explain this holding, Justice Zap-
pala cited Rhoads v. Heberling," and Laniecki v. Polish Army
Veterans Ass'n,20 two Superior Court cases that the Justice be-
lieved properly reflected and applied the Hilbert decision.2
The Court then discussed two of its own recent decisions, deci-
sions that involved an assessment of the nature of punitive dam-
ages.12 In Feld v. Merriam,2s the Court adopted Section 908(2) of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which, as Justice Zappala
15. 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959).
16. Id. In Hilbert, the plaintiff-decedent died as a result of an automobile accident
which involved Dale Rutz and Frederick Roth, both of whom were drag racing at the time.
Initially, the plaintiff sued the Rutz estate for compensatory damages and also sued Roth
for compensatory and punitive damages. A joint trial was held, and the trial court granted
withdrawal of a juror as to Roth because of the awkwardness of the application of the dead
man's rule only to the Rutz case. The trial proceeded against the Rutz estate and resulted in
a verdict of $10,000 for the plaintiff. Judgement was entered and satisfied. Defendant Roth
then petitioned the court to discontinue the action as to him because judgement had been
satisfied in the case. The petition was granted and on appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania affirmed. Id.
17. Kirkbride, 555 A.2d at 802.
18. Id.
19. 306 Pa. Super. 35, 451 A.2d 1378 (1982). In Rhoads, the defendant appealed from
a judgement of the Court of Common Pleas against defendant who intentionally fired eight
bullets from a semiautomatic rifle into an automobile occupied by the four plaintiffs. In
affirming, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that: 1) if the facts state a cause of
action, punitive damages may be awarded even though compensatory damages are not and
2) that the amount of punitive damages need not bear any relationship to the amount
awarded as compensatory damages. Id.
20. 331 Pa. Super. 413, 480 A.2d 1101 (1984). In Laniecki, plaintiff brought a trespass
action for libel against a veterans association and its commander. The jury found that the
plaintiff had been libelled but, while awarding $5,000 in punitive damages, the jury granted
no compensatory damages. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed by hold-
ing that the punitive damages award in the absence of compensatory damages was war-
ranted. Id. at 1103.
21. 555 A.2d at 802.
22. Id. at 803.
23. 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984).
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noted, made no reference to any requirement that punitive dam-
ages be proportional to compensatory damages.24 Justice Zappala
also distinguished Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp.,25 a case that
the Superior Court cited in support of the reasonable relationship
requirement when it reversed the trial court's holding for the Kirk-
brides.26 In distinguishing the Martin decision, Justice Zappala
concluded that because the basis for the decision stemmed from
"products liability litigation as an attempt to prevent a single
plaintiff from receiving punitive damages owed to all consumers as
the result of a defendant's decision to place a defective product on
the market," any reliance placed on Martin in the present case
would be improper.
In addition to his evaluation of prior case law, Justice Zappala
discussed the purpose of punitive damages as a deterrent.2" In so
doing, Justice Zappala stated that if the amount of punitive dam-
ages must bear a reasonable relationship to the injury suffered,
then those damages probably would not serve as a deterrent. 29
24. Kirkbride, 555 A.2d at 747. Section 908(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
states that:
Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing
punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of the defend-
ant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused
or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977).
25. 508 Pa. 154, 494 A.2d 1088 (1985). This case involved a trespass action brought by
an insulation worker seeking compensatory and punitive damages for asbestosis and related
diseases which he claimed he developed as a result of working with products containing
asbestos manufactured by defendant. A jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff's favor,
awarding him $67,000 in compensatory damages. In an attempt to obtain punitive damages,
plaintiff motioned for a new trial. The motion was denied and the plaintiff appealed to the
Superior Court on several grounds. The Superior Court reversed and remanded for a new
trial limited to the issue of damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated
the order of the Superior Court but remanded to the Superior Court for its determination as
to an issue not addressed in the previous appeal because of the disposition of other issues.
In dicta, the Supreme Court stated: 1) In order to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff
must first prove actual compensatory damages, and 2) that punitive damages must bear a
reasonable relationship to compensatory damages. Id.
26. Kirkbride, 555 A.2d at 803.
27. Id. In Martin, the court wanted to prevent multiple recovery at the defendant-
seller's expense by ensuring that the plaintiff collected only his proportion of the punitive
damages which the defendant owed to all of the purchasers and consumers of its products.
Martin, 494 A.2d at 1099.
28. 555 A.2d at 803.
29. Id. In support of this statement, Justice Zappala used the example whereby outra-
geous conduct only resulted in nominal damages, thus resulting in small punitive damages if
the reasonable relationship requirement were in effect. He reasoned that if the resulting
punishment was relatively small when compared to the potential reward of the conduct, it
874 Vol. 28:871
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Finally, Justice Zappala stated that the Court is cognizant that
at some point the amount of punitive damages may be so dispro-
portionate when compared to the character of the act, the nature
and extent of the harm and the wealth of the defendant, that it
will shock the Court's sense of justice.30 In such a situation, the
Court is given discretion to remit the damages to a more reasona-
ble amount.
3 1
Justice Flaherty, in a short dissenting opinion, stated that the
court had always held that punitive damages must bear a reasona-
ble relationship to compensatory damages and that he perceived
no reason to depart from that requirement.32 The Justice con-
tended that by requiring a reasonable relationship between puni-
tive and compensatory damage awards, appellate courts are af-
forded a standard by which to review punitive damage awards"
Justice Flaherty also stated that the primary purpose of civil dam-
ages was to compensate an injured party rather than to. punish the
wrongdoer, which was reserved for the criminal law.3 Finally, he
considered punitive damage awards that had no reasonable rela-
tionship to the harm suffered to be per se shocking to the tradi-
tionally felt sense of justice.
3 5
An examination of the origin and evolution of punitive damages
involves a discussion that is both extensive and lengthy.3 6 Such a
discussion would add little to the analysis and understanding of
the Kirkbride decision. However, a more limited review, one in-
volving the origin and development of the reasonable relationship
requirement in Pennsylvania, is warranted.
When torts are committed willfully, maliciously, or so negli-
gently as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others,
might then be feasible for a tortfeasor to attempt the same outrageous conduct a second
time. Id.
30. Id. at 803-04.
31. Id. In support of this discretion to remit the damages, the Court cited Sulecki v.
Southeast National Bank, 358 Pa. Super. 132, 516 A.2d 1217 (1986) (Olszewski, J., concur-
ring). Id.
32. Id. In support of this contention, Justice Flaherty cited the following cases without
explanation: Martin v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 508 Pa. 154, 494 A.2d 1088 (1985); Hughes v.
Babcock, 349 Pa. 475, 37 A.2d 551 (1944); Givens v. W. J. Gilmore Drug Co., 337 Pa. 278, 10
A.2d 12 (1940); Thompson v. Swank, 317 Pa. 158, 176 A. 211 (1934); Mitchell v. Randal, 288
Pa. 518, 137 A. 171 (1927). Id.
33. 555 A.2d at 804.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. For further discussion involving the history of punitive damages see: Sales and
Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117
(1984).
1990
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punitive damages may be awarded. 37 In an attempt to establish a
rule for determining the proper amount of punitive damages, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Rider v. York Haven Water &
Power Co.,3s first introduced the reasonable relationship require-
ment to Pennsylvania. In Rider, the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia quoted and adopted the views expressed by the Supreme Court
of Kentucky, which, in a then recent decision, stated:
We know no general rule upon the subject of awarding punitive damages,
except that the damages must not be so excessive as to indicate that the
jury was influenced by passion or prejudice, and must have some reasonable
relation to the injury and cause of it, and must not be disproportionate to
the one or the other.
39
After the Rider decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an
ensuing line of cases, applied and further reinforced the reasonable
relationship requirement.' Accordingly, the prevailing rule became
that punitive damages had to be proportionate to compensatory
damages.41 The most recent application of this rule by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court was in Martin v. Johns-Mansville Corp.,"2
where the Court cited Hughes v. Babcock, the most current of the
line of cases that developed as an offspring to the Rider decision.' 3
It is this previously uncontroverted line of cases and the decision
in Martin that Justice Flaherty cited as being simply dispositive of
the issue in Kirkbride." However, the majority, speaking through
Justice Zappala, deemed it appropriate to overrule approximately
75 years of well established precedent.' 5 In so doing, the majority
focused its discussion on the Hughes decision. 6
Essentially the Majority disposed of this prior case law by stat-
37. This general rule has remained unchanged in Pennsylvania case law since it was
first expressed in early Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions. See Pittsburgh, C. & St. L.
Ry. Co. v. Lyon, 123 Pa. 140, 16 A. 607, 609 (1889).
38. 251 Pa. 18, 95 A. 803 (1915).
39. 95 A. at 806. See Buford V. Hopewell, 140 Ky. 666, 131 S.W. 502 (1910).
40. See Mitchell v. Randal, 288 Pa. 518, 137 A. 171 (1927); Thompson v. Swank, 317
Pa. 158, 176 A. 211 (1934); Givens v. W. J. Gilmore Drug Co., 337 Pa. 278, 10 A.2d 12 (1940);
Hughes v. Babcock, 349 Pa. 475, 37 A.2d 551 (1944). Although the specific fact pattern in
each of these cases is varied, in each case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited either
Rider, or one of these previous cases which cited Rider, or both, in advancing the general
rule that punitive damages had to be proportionate to compensatory damages.
41. See supra, note 40. Each case in note 40 can be cited as advancing this rule.
42. See supra, note 25, for the facts of this case..
43. Martin, 494 A.2d at 1098.
44. 555 A.2d at 804.
45. 555 A.2d at 803.
46. Id. at 801-802.
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ing that the Court in Hughes made a mistake in reading the Re-
statement of Torts.47 While Comment (e) to Section 908 of the Re-
statement speaks of proportionality with regard to the means or
wealth of the guilty person,48 the Majority in Kirkbride perceived
that the Court in Hughes misconstrued this proportionality to be
between compensatory and punitive damages. 49 However, upon re-
view of the Hughes decision this mistake is not apparent.50 Fur-
ther, the reasonable relationship requirement as expressed in
Hughes was in no way derived, established or expanded from an
analysis involving the Restatement.5' Rather, the requirement of
proportionality as used in Hughes was merely cited as law from
previous cases.52 Thus, by focusing its discussion on only the
Hughes decision, the Court refused to acknowledge and discuss the
previous cases that advanced and established the reasonable rela-
tionship requirement.5"
After determining that Hughes was invalid, and in so doing, also
discrediting all previous case law, Justice Zappala concluded that
cases subsequent to Hughes must be evaluated to assess the viabil-
ity of the reasonable relationship theory of punitive damages.
54
This evaluation began with a discussion of the decision in Hilbert
v. Roth.55 In Hilbert, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated
that "It is well recognized that no award for punitive damages may
be made where actual damages have not been suffered."5' The Hil-
47. Id. at 802. After citing Thompson v. Swank, 317 Pa. 158, 176 A. 211 (1934), and
Mitchell v. Randal, 288 Pa. 518, 137 A. 171 (1927), to support the contention that exemplary
damages must not be disproportionate to compensatory damages, the court in Hughes then
stated: "Moreover, in determining the amount of punitive damages, not merely the act must
be considered, but all the surrounding circumstances, including the motives of the wrong-
doer, and the relations between the parties." In support of this statement, the court cited
the Restatement of Torts § 908, Comment (e). Hughes, 37 A.2d at 554. Because this was the
only use of § 908 Comment (e), it is hard to see how this section of the Restatement could
be seen as supporting or advancing the reasonable relationship requirement.
48. See supra, note 13 for the text of Comment (e).
49. 555 A.2d at 802.
50. See supra, note 47.
51. See supra, note 47.
52. See supra, note 47.
53. Justice Zappala determined that Hughes was not controlling, however he did not
address any other cases. 555 A.2d at 802. See supra, note 32 for a list of cases that both the
Superior Court and Justice Flaherty cited as controlling.
54. 555 A.2d at 802.
55. 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959). See supra, note 16 for the facts of this case.
56. Hilbert, 149 A.2d at 652. In support of this statement, the Court cited Hygenic
Fleeced Underwear Co. v. Way, 35 Pa.Super 229, 235 (1907); Benson v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
66 Pittsb.Leg.J. 350 (1917); and the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908, comment (c). Id. In
Hygenic Fleeced, the plaintiff filed an action in slander against the defendant because of
1990
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bert Court further stated that "The right to punitive damages is a
mere incident to a cause of action . . . and not the subject of an
action itself.
5 7
In Rhoads v. Heberling,5 the Superior Court explained that the
language in Hilbert was not meant to articulate that a jury can not
award punitive damages without first awarding a specific amount
of compensatory damages.59 Rather, the court in Rhoads empha-
sized that if the facts support a cognizable cause of action, then
punitive damages can be awarded even if compensatory damages
are not awarded. 0
Justice Zappala also cited Laniecki v. Polish Army Veterans
Ass'n,e1 a Superior Court decision which applied the Rhoads expla-
nation of Hilbert.2 In Laniecki, the court stressed that an award
of punitive damages can be sustained without the awarding of
compensatory damages, provided that there is a valid cause of ac-
tion for compensatory damages."3
The significance of the evaluation and discussion of the Hilbert
decision served the purpose of showing the independent nature of
punitive damages. By citing Rhoads and Laniecki, Justice Zappala
was clearly demonstrating that there is no conditional reliance in
the awarding of punitive damages on the awarding of compensa-
tory damages. 4 Although this discussion does not directly address
certain information that the defendant published in an advertisement. 35 Pa. Super. at 230-
231. In Benson, the plaintiff sued in negligence for emotional distress caused by the defend-
ant when the train in which the plaintiff was riding carried him past his stop without warn-
ing him or without his knowledge. 66 PITTSB. LEG. J. at 350.
57. Hygenic Fleeced Underwater Co. v. Way, 35 Pa. Super. 229, 140 A.2d at 652
(1908).
58. 306 Pa. Super. 35, 451 A.2d 1378 (1982). See supra note 19 for the facts of this
case.
59. Rhoads, 451 A.2d at 1382. The court in Rhoads concluded that the cases cited in
Hilbert did not support a contrary finding. In making this conclusion, the court in Rhoads
noted that the Hygenic Fleeced decision dealt with a slander action which, as the essence of
the action, required the initial finding of special damages. The court also noted that in the
Benson decision, the court denied recovery because no cause of action was cognizable under
the applicable law. Id. at 1382-1383.
60. Id. at 1381. To further support this assertion, the court stated that Pennsylvania
has adopted Comment (c) to § 908 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. (1965). The
relevant portion that the court cited is as follows: "It is essential . . . that facts be estab-
lished which, apart from punitive damages, are sufficient to maintain a cause of action. Id.
61. 331 Pa. Super 413, 480 A.2d 1101 (1984). See supra note 20 for the facts of this
case.
62. 555 A.2d at 802-803.
63. Laniecki, 480 at 1106-1107. This case also cited § 908, comment (c) of the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). Id.
64. Ironically, in Martin, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited the Hilbert deci-
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the reasonable relationship requirement, it does provide pertinent
general groundwork for understanding the association between pu-
nitive and compensatory damages."
After providing this general groundwork, Justice Zappala then
specifically dealt with how current case law has addressed the rea-
sonable relationship requirement. There has only been one Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court decision since Hughes that has addressed
the reasonable relationship requirement. In Martin v. Johns-
Manville Corp.,6 the court stated that punitive damages must
bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages.6 7 Fur-
ther, the Court cited Hughes to support this requirement.6 How-
ever, the situation in Martin dealt with multiple litigants in a
mass-marketed products liability action. 9 As such, the court in
that decision paid particular attention to the role that the reasona-
ble relationship requirement had in only allowing one litigant, out
of multiple litigants, to receive his proportional share of the total
punitive damage award.7 0 Accordingly, the Martin decision can be
easily and accurately distinguished as being only applicable to
products liability.
In Feld v. Merriam,71 although the court did not discuss the rea-
sonable relationship theory, it did affirmatively embrace and ac-
cept Section 908(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts regard-
ing the imposition of punitive damages. 7' Because Section 908(2)
makes no reference to the reasonable relationship theory, Justice
Zappala concluded that the Supreme Court had not accepted such
a theory.73
It is uncontroverted that the purpose of punitive damages is to
serve as both a punishment and a deterrent. There is merit to the
sion as holding that a plaintiff must first prove actual compensatory damages in order to
recover punitive damages. Martin, 494 A.2d at 1098.
65. This discussion also served the purpose of clarifying the Hilbert decision, which is
commonly misunderstood. See supra, note 64, which shows that it is misunderstood in as
recent a case as Martin.
66. 508 Pa. 154, 494 A.2d 1088 (1985). See supra, note 25 for the facts of this case.
67. Martin, 494 A.2d at 1098. This court cited Hughes.
68. Id. This court also cited Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines Ltd., 548 F.Supp. 357
(E.D.Pa. 1982)(applying PA law). Note that in Neal, the court cited Givens as the applica-
ble law. 548 F.Supp. at 377. Givens is one of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases prior to
Hughes.
69. 494 A.2d at 1092.
70. 494 A.2d at 1099.
71. 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984).
72. 485 A.2d at 747.
73. 555 A.2d at 803.
1990
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Supreme Court's contention that the requirement of proportional-
ity defeats such a purpose. It is clear that the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has unequivocally adopted Section 908(2) of the Sec-
ond Restatement of Torts and that no reference is made by this
section, nor any other section, to a reasonable relationship require-
ment. Further, the Martin decision was properly distinguished as
being specifically applicable to products liability litigation. How-
ever, despite these correct insights, the Supreme Court in Kirk-
bride gave insufficient service to the doctrine of Stare Decisis when
it precariously overruled Hughes, and paid no attention to the pu-
nitive damage cases prior to Hughes.
The significance of the Kirkbride decision is obvious. Because
punitive damages are such an integral part of civil litigation, the
ramifications of Kirkbride are broad. The previous and commonly
accepted process of awarding punitive damages has been replaced.
Because of this radical change, a forceful and concrete opinion was
necessitated.
Despite overruling 75 years of prior case law, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania had valid reasons to support this change. Essen-
tially, the Court was concerned with maintaining the integrity of
punitive damages as a valid deterrent. Further, the Court was con-
cerned that the application of the reasonable relationship require-
ment would usurp the jury's function of weighing the factors set
forth in Section 908 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. How-
ever, if the Court had recognized prior case law but instead deter-
mined, based on the strength of its arguments, that a change, away
from the reasonable relationship requirement, was necessary, then
this decision would be more concrete and forceful. By practically
ignoring prior case law, the Court only weakened what otherwise
would have been a valid and sound decision.
Thomas H. Ayoob
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